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INDIANS - DOMICILE: FEDERAL DEFINITION OF
DOMICILE DETERMINES JURISDICTION UNDER
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
In December 1985, twin illegitimate children were born to
enrolled members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
residing on the Choctaw Reservation.' The twin babies were born
approximately 200 miles from the reservation.2 In January 1986,
the parents executed adoption consent forms in the state chancery
court.3 Following adoption by a non-Indian couple,4 the Choctaw
Tribe moved to vacate the adoption decree asserting that the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) vested exclusive jurisdiction in
the tribal court.5 Both the state chancery court 6 and the Missis-
1. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1602 (1989). The
twins were born December 29, 1985. Id. The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians is an
Indian Tribe duly organized pursuant to Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, as amended. 25 U.S.C. § 467 (1934).
2. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1602. The twin children were born in Gulfport, Mississippi.Id.
3. Id. The mother, J.B., executed the consent-to-adoption form on January 10, 1986.
Id. The father, W.J., signed a consent on January 11, 1986. Id. at 1602 n.8. Section 1913(a)
of the ICWA states that consent to foster care or termination of parental rights is invalid
unless executed in writing and recorded before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction.
25 U.S.C. § 19 13(a) (1978). The court must verify that the parent understood the
ramifications of giving consent. Id.
4. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1602-1603. The chancery court issued the Final Decree of
Adoption to Orrey and Vivian Holyfield on January 28, 1986. Id. at 1603. The adoption was
pursuant to Mississippi state law, and the six month waiting period was waived by the
chancellor. Id. at 1603 n.10. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (Supp. 1989). The adoption
decree contained no reference to the ICWA or the children's Indian background.
Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1603.
5. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1603. On March 31, 1986, the Tribe filed a motion to vacate
the adoption. Id. Section 1914 of the ICWA provides that Indian parents, custodians, or the
child's tribe may petition a court to invalidate a child custody proceeding if § 1911 (Indian
tribe jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings), § 1912 (requirement of notice,
rehabilitative, and remedial services), or § 1913 (consent to voluntary termination by the
parent, be in writing, and may be withdrawn at any time prior to entry of the final decree)
are violated. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1978).
The Tribe contended that the Mississippi state court ignored recognized principles of
Federal Indian Law which serve to protect tribal self-government and Indian sovereignty.
Brief for Appellant at - (LEXIS) Holyfield (No. 97-980). The federal power over Indian
affairs is exclusively vested in the United States Congress and derives from the Indian
Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (imposition of state taxation interferes with matters which treaties and
statutes leave exclusively to the Federal government). The right of Indian tribes to
exclusively regulate the domestic relations of their members upon tribal lands is also
established doctrine. See Montana v. U.S. 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (the tribe may regulate
members and non-members from hunting or fishing on tribal land); U.S. v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 322 n.18 (1978) (tribes have the power to enforce criminal laws against tribal
members); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386-389 (1976) (right of the tribe to
govern without imposition of state law in an adoption proceeding characterized as litigation
arising on the reservation); see also F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, 362-
363 (1986) (describing the power of Indian tribes as inherent powers of a limited sovereign).
6. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1603. The chancery court overruled the Tribe's motion on
July 14, 1986. Id. The chancery court held that the Tribe never had exclusive jurisdiction
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sippi Supreme Court7 overruled the Tribe's motion on the grounds
that the twins had never been domiciled on the reservation and
the parents had voluntarily surrendered custody.8 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi Supreme
Court and held that Congress intended a uniform federal law of
domicile to prevail and that the twins were domiciled on the
Choctaw reservation under the ICWA's exclusive jurisdiction pro-
vision.' Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S.
Ct. 1597 (1989).
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) was enacted to
"protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights
of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its
society." 10 The ICWA provides exclusive tribal jurisdiction over
child custody proceedings for Indian children domiciled on a
reservation. 11
over the babies because the Indian mother had arranged for the birth and subsequent
adoption off of the Reservation.
7. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the Tribe's contention that the state
court lacked jurisdiction. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 511 So. 2d 918
(Miss. 1987). In recognizing that the key jurisdictional issue was whether the twins were
domiciled on the reservation, the court responded:
At no point in time can it be said the twins resided on or were domiciled within
the territory set aside for the reservation. Appellant's argument that living
within the womb of their mother qualifies the children's residency on the
reservation may be lauded for its creativity; however, apparently it is
unsupported by any law within this state, and will not be addressed at this time
due to the far-reaching legal ramifications that would occur were we to follow
such a complicated tangential course.
Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1603 (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 511
So. 2d 918, 921 (Miss. 1987)). The state supreme court distinguished previous Mississippi
cases that would seem to establish precedent for the child's domicile being the same as that
of the natural parents. See, e.g., Boyle v. Griffin, 84 Miss. 41, 36 So. 141, 142 (1904) (inability
of children to change from their parents' domicile during minority); Stubbs v. Stubbs, 211
So. 2d. 821, 824 (Miss. 1968) (domicile of mother and father is domicile of minor child); In re
Watson, 317 So. 2d 30, 32 (Miss. 1975) (the residence of a minor is that of his parents and
remains so during the period of minority in spite of temporary absence at school or else-
where). The Mississippi Supreme Court did not find these cases controlling because of the
efforts of the natural parents to ensure that the babies did not reside on the reservation and
because the twins had never been outside of their adoptive parents' county. Holyfield, 109
S. Ct. at 1603 (citing Holyfield, 511 So. 2d at 921).
8. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1603.
9. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1610-1611. The adoption decree was vacated and the case
remanded to the Choctaw Tribal Court. Id. at 1611.
10. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978).
11. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1601. Section 1911 (a) of the ICWA states:
an Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within
the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested
in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian Child is a ward of a tribal
court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
residence or domicile of the child.
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The ICWA was passed due to concern about the large num-
bers of Indian children separated from their families by state agen-
cies through adoption or foster care.' 2 Senate hearings held in
1974 established the extent of the problem and identified the dis-
proportionate percentage of Indian child placements and adop-
tions as a major threat to the survival of Indian families and Indian
culture. 3 Further hearings were held in 1977 and 1978 on legisla-
tion proposed to ameliorate the problem. 14 Testimony empha-
sized the destructive impact on both individual families and the
tribe caused by the removal of their children.' It was suggested
at the hearings that these Indian child placements occurred at
U.S.C. § 1911 (a) (1978).
12. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1600. Few government agencies providing care for Indian
children are able to help Indian communities and families solve child welfare problems
except by means of placement. Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings on S. 1214 before
the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd
Cong., 2nd Sess. 128-129 (1974) (statement of Dr. Robert Bergman) [hereinafter 1974
Hearings]. This procedure usually solves problems only in the sense of removing children
from the child welfare problem while destroying families and communities over time. Id.
Indian children continue to be removed from their tribal culture. Today, however, this
occurs through adoption by non-Indian families and placement in non-Indian foster care
homes and institutions. American Indian Policy Review, Final Report Hearings on S. 1214
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1977) (statement
of Nancy Amidei reporting results of a Health, Education, and Welfare survey) [hereinafter
Final Report]. There is strong evidence that Indian children are being removed from their
families and placed in non-Indian adoptive homes, foster care, special institutions, and
federal boarding schools at rates grossly out of proportion to their percentage of the
population. HR. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978). In the United States, one in
every 200 children lives outside of his home of origin. Id. In North Dakota, South Dakota,
and Nebraska, one out of every nine Indians are in foster homes, institutions, or boarding
facilities. Id. Indian children are withdrawn from their homes at a rate 20 times the
national average. Id. In a survey of 16 states, approximately 85% of all Indian children
were in foster care. Id. Surveys of states with large Indian populations conducted by the
Association of American Indian Affairs (AAIA) indicate that approximately 25-35% of all
Indian children are separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive
homes, or institutions. Id.
13. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1600 (citing Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings on S.
1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 3, 15 (1974). Public and private welfare agencies seem to
operate on the premise that most Indian children would be better off growing up non-
Indian. Id. at 128-129. The result of such policies has been unchecked, abusive child-
removal practices, the lack of viable, practical rehabilitation programs for Indian families
facing severe problems, and a practice of ignoring the demands of Indian tribes to
participate in adjudicating their domestic problems. Id.
14. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1600 n.2 (citing Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings
on S. 1214 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter 1977 Hearings]; Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings on S. 1214 Before
the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings].
15. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1600-1601. Chief Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians and representative of the National Tribal Chairmen's Association,
testified:
One of the most serious failings of the present system is that Indian children are
removed from the custody of their natural parents by nontribal government
authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social
premises underlying Indian home life and child-rearing. Many of the individuals
are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst contemptful of the Indian
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such alarming rates due to misperceptions and lack of knowledge
on the part of governmental authorities - social workers, child
welfare agencies, and judges - about Indian cultural and social
child-rearing practices. 16 These findings were incorporated into
way and convinced that removal, usually to a non-Indian household or
institution, can only benefit an Indian child.
Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1601 (citing 1978 Hearings, supra note 14, 191-192). There is no
area in which it is more important that tribal sovereignty be respected than in an area as
socially and culturally determinative as family relationships. 1978 Hearings, supra note 14,
at 193. See also Wamser, Child Welfare Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A
New Mexico Focus, 10 N.M.L.REV. 413 91980) (includes a review of legislative history and
the problems created by removing Indian children from Indian homes).
16. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1600-1601 (citing 1978 Hearings, supra note 14, at 191-193).
Too often non-Indian state officials who are insensitive to Indian culture and society make
the decisions regarding the best interest of Indian children in removal and placement
situations. Barsch, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analyses, 31 HASTINGS L.
J., 1287, 1294 (1980). Practitioners in the Indian child welfare area believe that state laws
do not reflect Indian culture. State standards and procedures have been inadequate.
Moreover, most state neglect statutes define neglect or dependency in broad, vague terms.
Note, Custody Pro visions of ICWA of 19 78: The Effect of Califo rn ia Dependency La w, 12
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 647, 648 (1979) (authored by Marilyn Miles). Such vagueness permits
state officials to make determinations on the basis of personal values and moral systems
which are likely to reflect the dominant white society. Id. at 649.
The separation of Indian children from their natural families is usually a result of
conflicting values between Indian and non-Indian social and legal systems. Jones, ICWA-A
Jurisdictional Approach, 21 Aniz. L. REV. 1123, 1126 (1979). The removal of Indian
children has been the result of professional and judicial attitudes towards Indians, state
judicial procedures, and the design and accessibility of federal child welfare programs. Id.
at 1126-1127. For example, application of state dependency and neglect statutes may
undermine tribal authority. Id. at 1127. Public officials are frequently unfamiliar with
Indian culture and society. Id. at 1126 n.28 (citing American Indian Policy Review Comm.,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Federal, State, and Tribal Jurisdiction 180 (Comm. Print
1976)). State courts apply traditional, white, culturally-determined standards in child care
proceedings even when Indian values may be at issue. Id. at 1128. A point of view that sees
only reservation poverty from which a child needs to be "rescued," fails to consider the
potentially greater loss to the child and tribe. Id.; Note, The Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978: Provisions and Policy, 25 S.D.L. REV. 98, 115 (1980) (authored by Linda Marousek)
(examines the requirements and policy of the ICWA).
Children are also removed from Indian homes because of cultural misperceptions
about the general level of poverty existing in Indian communities. 124 CONG. REC. 38101,
38102 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall). Poverty is used by state welfare agencies and
officials as prima facia evidence for removing the children from their families, whereas the
conditions may reflect an inherent community standard rather than actual neglect.
Ishisaka, American Indians and Foster Care: Cultural Factors and Separation, 57:5 CHILD
WELFARE 302-304 (1978). Many Indian families receive welfare and are supervised by
social workers. See Note, supra note 16, at 652. The increased exposure to persons who are
obligated to report instances of perceived child care deficiencies is likely to result in more
complaints to agencies concerning Indian children as compared to non-Indian children. Id.
Such complaints may lead to court proceedings to declare these children neglected and to
remove them from Indian homes. Id.
It has long been recognized that the standards of non-Indian society relating to
parental fitness are different from those of Indian society. See Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050,
1054-55 (Alaska 1972). An important cultural trait for Indian families is the continuing
importance of family kinship. Note, supra note 16, at 652-53 n.31. Distinctions between
the nuclear and the extended family may be blurred for Indian children. Id. The state may
consider placement of children with extended families as evidence of neglect, whereas
Indian families often perceive placing their children with relatives as commonplace and
acceptable. Id. Anglo-European law focuses on the nuclear parent-child relationship to the
exclusion of other claims. Brief at - (LEXIS). Indian family law focuses on a broader
context - the child's relationship to a common group sharing mutual child-rearing
expectations. Id. Indian law is not concerned with legalizing the parent-child relationship.
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the ICWA when Congress determined: a) children are essential
for the perpetuation of Indian tribes, b) adoptive situations are
placed in non-Indian homes, and c) the state administrative and
judicial bodies have failed to recognize prevailing Indian social
and cultural standards. 17
The jurisdictional scheme is central to the ICWA.' 8 Exclusive
tribal court jurisdiction is mandated for child custody proceedings
involving an Indian child domiciled on a reservation and for wards
of tribal courts wherever domiciled. 19 Concurrent jurisdiction is
Id. Rigid categories or legal conclusions regarding the child's status seem to be unnecessary
when informal mechanisms for temporary or permanent care exist within the kinship
system. Id.
Courts have also recognized the strength and importance of the Indian extended
family. See, e.g., Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456, 477 (9th Cir.
1971) (in the context of evaluating a public assistance plan, the court cited that "the
evidence showed... a common, if not the predominant cultural pattern among... Indians
in Arizona is the 'extended family' "'); Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannaville Indian
Community v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 726, 733-734 (W.D. Mich. N.D. 1973) (noting
testimony concerning the kinship community and role of grandparents and great-uncles in
raising children and finding that the great-uncle had attempted, pursuant to tribal custom,
to obtain custody of the children in question).
A second trait that may be misinterpreted by state officials is Indian child-rearing
practices. Note, supra note 16, at 652. Indian children are often given greater
responsibility at an earlier age than in white society. C. POWELL, THE PSYCHOSOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF MINORITY GROUP CHILDREN 261-62 (1983). They may remain
unsupervised or undertake the responsibility of younger children at an early age. Id. These
more "permissive" child-rearing practices may result in an appearance to state child
welfare workers that the parents do not care or are providing inadequate supervision. Id.
17. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1601 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978)). The American
Indian Policy Review Committee summarized the congressional findings:
1. The removal of Indian children from their natural homes and tribal setting
has been and continues to be a national crisis.
2. Removal of Indian Children from their cultural setting seriously impacts
long-term tribal survival and has damaging social and psychological impact
on many individual Indian children.
3. Non-Indian public and private agencies, with some expectations, show
almost no sensitivity to Indian culture and society.
4. Recent litigation in attempting to cure the problem of the removal of Indian
children, although valuable, cannot affect a total solution.
5. The current systems of data collection concerning the removal and
placement of Indian children are woefully inadequate and "hide" the full
dimension of the problems.
6. The U.S. Government, pursuant to its trust responsibility to Indian tribes, has
failed to protect the most valuable resource of any tribe - its children.
7. The policy of the United States should be to do all within its power to ensure
that Indian children remain in Indian homes.
Final Report, supra note 14, at 52.
18. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1601.
19. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (a) (1978)). "Child custody" proceedings include foster
care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, and adoptive
placement. 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1) (1978). "Indian child" is defined as any unmarried person
who is under 18 and is a member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership and is the
biological child of a tribe member. 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (4) (1978). "Reservation" is broadly
defined to include Indian country and any lands held in trust for any tribe or individual
Indian. 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (10) (1978).
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provided for children not domiciled on the reservation. 20 Either
the parent or the tribe may petition for transfer of custody pro-
ceedings from state court to tribal court except in cases of good
cause, parental objection, or refusal by the tribal court.2 '
The Act further delineates various procedural and substantive
standards for the child custody proceedings that do take place in
state court.22 The most important substantive requirement man-
dates that adoptive placements be made preferentially with mem-
bers of the child's extended family, other tribe members, or other
Indian families, absent "good cause" to the contrary.23 Through
these requirements, the ICWA seeks to protect the right of Indian
20. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1601-1602. Jurisdiction is concurrent but presumptively
tribal. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1978).
21. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1601-1602. "Good cause to the contrary" is not defined in
25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), however, Congressional hearings indicate that the definition was
intended to operate as a form of forum non conveniens. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21 (1978); 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1978).
22. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978). Procedural and substantive standards include
§ 1911(c) (the parent, custodian, or tribe's right to intervene in state court proceedings),§ 1911(d) (full faith and credit to acts, records, and proceedings related to child custody
proceedings); § 1912(a) (notice), § 1912(b) (appointment of counsel for the Indian parent or
custodian and optional counsel for the child), § 1912(c) (right to examine reports or
documents), § 1912(d) (right to remedial services to prevent the breakup of Indian families),
§ 1912(e) (no foster care placement without clear and convincing evidence), § 1912(f)
(proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for parental rights termination); § 1913(a)
(voluntary consent must be executed in writing before a judge of a court of competent
jurisdiction), § 1913(b) (consent to foster care placement may be withdrawn), § 1913(c)
(parental consent to adoption may be withdrawn at anytime before a final decree),
§ 1913(d) (consent to a final adoption may be withdrawn on the grounds of fraud or duress);
§ 1914 (a custody proceeding may be invalidated if §§ 1911, 1912, or 1913 are violated);
§ 1915(a) (preference in adoptive placements to be with 1) member of the extended family,
2) other members of the tribe, or 3) other Indian families), § 1915 (b) (provides criteria for
foster care placement), § 1915 (c) (the tribe may alter the preference order), § 1915 (d)
(social and cultural standards of the Indian community are to apply), § 1915 (e) (records of
placements to be kept); § 1916 (return of custody); § 1917 (right to information by an
adopted Indian after 18-years-old); § 1918 (resumption of jurisdiction); § 1919 (agreements
between state and tribes are authorized); § 1920 (courts to declare jurisdiction after
improper removal of a child ); § 1921 (if state or federal standards are higher than the Act
they will apply); § 1922 (emergency removal of children). 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911-1922 (1978).
Sections 1901 and 1902 itemize congressional findings and policy. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902
(1978). Section 1923 provides for the effective date of the ICWA provisions. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1923 (1978).
Procedural requirements were considered necessary because testimony indicated that
separations often occur where the natural parent does not understand the nature of the
legal documents or proceedings involved. 124 CONG. REC. 38101, 38102 (1978). Only
about 10% of Indian children and their parents are represented by counsel at involuntary
placement proceedings. Id. Many observers have blamed the frequency of Indian child
removals on procedural irregularities in state courts. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1978). Procedural irregularities and errors of this type that go undetected initially
are especially serious because state appellate judges tend to believe subsequent reversals of
custody orders are not in the best interests of the children involved. Barsch, supra note 16,
at 1300. Even when notified, Indian parents frequently have appeared without
representation. Id. See generally AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC.:
SUGGESTED STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT OF 1978 (1979) (explains the provisions of the Act and discusses procedural
rights).
23. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1602.
558
1990] CASE COMMENT 559
children and Indian tribes to retain their cultural identity and to
govern their own family relationships.24
Tribal jurisdiction for Indian child custody cases did not arise
with enactment of the ICWA.25 In fact, many of the ICWA juris-
dictional provisions were based on existing state and federal case
law.26 In general, "domicile" has been equated with the "arising
on the Indian reservation" standard required to preempt the exer-
cise of state authority.27  Using this standard, exclusive tribal juris-
diction had been upheld in several pre-ICWA cases.28
Courts have generally recognized the crucial importance of
24. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978). An issue involving tribal
members which arises in a civil context will frequently depend on questions of tribal
tradition and custom which are more appropriately evaluated in tribal forums. Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978). Interference with tribal jurisdiction over such
matters would "substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally
and politically distinct entity." Id. at 72. The same principles are expressed through
enactment of the ICWA in regards to state court involvement. 1974 Hearings, supra note
12, at 33. Tribal jurisdiction over child custody decisions involving Indian children must be
protected if tribal self-government is to be perpetuated. Id.
25. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1604.
26. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1604-1605.
27. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976).
28. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976). In Fisher, the Supreme
Court rejected state court jurisdiction over an adoption of an Indian child because state
court jurisdiction would interfere with Indian self-government. Id. at 387. Even though
the child had been born off of the reservation and the parents had been married and
divorced off the reservation, the "residence of the litigants" determined jurisdiction. Id. at
389-390 n.14.
See, e.g., Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F.
Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973). This case concerned custody of children of deceased parents,
an Indian father and non-Indian mother. Id. at 721-722. All three children were born off
the reservation and lived for a period of time off of the reservation. Id. The court
determined that the domicile of the children followed the parents. Id. at 731-732.
Rejecting the notion that physical presence is necessary to establish domicile, the Houston
court held that at the time of their death, the parents had been domiciled on the
reservation. Id. at 732. Thus the tribe was vested with exclusive jurisdiction for
determining custody. Id. at 734. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d
228 (1975). Non-Indian guardians of an Indian child sought permanent custody of the child
in a state court proceeding. Id. at -, 347 A.2d at 230. Even though the child was residing
in Maryland, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe
based upon the reservation domicile of the child. Id. at _, 347 A.2d at 238. The court
found that child-rearing is an "essential tribal relation" and that tribally-appointed
guardians cannot shift the domicile of the child. Id. at -, 347 A.2d at 234. The Wakefield
court concluded that "[bly using the Indian child's domicile as the state's jurisdictional basis,
the Indian tribe is afforded significant protection from losing its essential rights of child-
rearing and maintenance of tribal identity." Id. at -, 347 A.2d at 238.
See, e.g., In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976). Notwithstanding that the
child had been placed by the tribal court in foster care off the reservation and in another
state, the tribe and not the state court had jurisdiction over the adoption because his
mother was domiciled on the reservation making the child a ward of the tribal court. Id. at
655, 555 P.2d at 1341.
See, e.g., In re Lelah-puc-ka-chee, 98 F. 429 (N.D. Iowa 1899). The Federal district
court concluded that the state court had no power to appoint a school administrator as
guardian for an Indian girl attending an off-reservation technical school when her parents
resided on the reservation. Id. at 433. The state lacked jurisdiction because the girl was a
member of an Indian tribe and the right to take charge of Indian domestic relations has
never been asserted by states. Id. at 432.
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child custody issues in the framework of tribal governance: If tri-
bal sovereignty is to have any meaning at all, it must necessarily
include the right within its own boundaries and membership to
provide for its young, a sine qua non to the preservation of tribal
identity.29 Thus, enactment of the ICWA affirmed the importance
of exclusive tribal jurisdiction to child custody proceedings for
children domiciled on the reservation.3 0
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
In child custody proceedings involving Indian children domi-
ciled on a reservation, the ICWA mandates exclusive tribal juris-
diction."' The case, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield3 2 involved a child custody proceeding, and the twins
were Indian children.3 3 Thus, the sole issue was whether the chil-
dren were domiciled on the reservation.3 4
The initial question was to determine whether state law defi-
nitions of domicile controlled.3 5 The Holyfield Court began its
analysis by stating that although the ICWA does not define "domi-
cile," its meaning may be ascertained by determining congres-
sional intent .3  The Court reasoned that it was unlikely that
Congress intended the ICWA definition to be a matter of state
law" because federal statutes are generally intended to have uni-
29. Wisconsin Potowatomies, 393 F.Supp. at 730.
30. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1604. In United States v. Quiver, the Supreme Court noted
that "personal and domestic relations of the Indians" have been regulated from "an early
period . . . according to their tribal customs and laws." United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S.
602, 603-604 (1916). Tribal exercise of jurisdiction over the domestic relations of tribal
members has been settled in case law and statutes since the 1800s. Id. at 603-604.
31. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). Section 1911(a) does not apply where jurisdiction is otherwise
vested in the state by federal law. Id. Public Law 280 allows for state jurisdiction in certain
civil and criminal matters. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588
(1953). ICWA § 1918 allows a tribe to resume jurisdiction upon request to the Secretary of
the Interior. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1605 n. 16. Mississippi never asserted jurisdiction over
the Choctaw Reservation under Public Law 280. Id.
32. 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
33. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1605 (1989).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The Court's task is to interpret the words of the statute in light of Congress'
purpose. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, 460 U.S. 103, 118 (1983) (citing Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979)).
37. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1605. Well-settled rules of statutory construction hold that
in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, it is assumed that Congress does not
intend to make its application dependent on state law. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,
460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 603 (1971)
(quoting N.L.R.B. v. Randolph Electric Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 62-63 (4th Cir.
1965)). See, e.g., Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943) (application of a federal
statute using the term "felony" does not incorporate state law); N.L.R.B. v. Natural Gas Util.
Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 603 (1971) (federal rather than state law governs interpretation of
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form nationwide application.3" The Court in Holyfield also recog-
nized the potential danger of impairing a federal program by
permitting state law to determine its parameters.3 9 Thus, the
Court determined intent by examining the purpose of the
statute.4 °
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,41 the Court rejected
using a state law definition of "employee" for the Wagner Act.42
This conclusion was premised on the belief that Congress intended
to solve a "national problem on a national scale" without hin-
drance by local interpretation, standards, or administration.4 3 The
Holyfield Court found this reasoning equally applicable in
rejecting a state law definition of domicile for the ICWA. 44
First, it was clear that Congress did not intend to rely on state
political subdivision); Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119 (purpose of the federal gun control statute
would be frustrated by making its application subject to state law).
When the court has used a state law definition, it has been when Congress clearly
indicated that uniformity was not intended. Holyfield, 109 St. Ct. at 1606. Congress
sometimes intends that state law give content to a federal statutory term. Id. at 1605 (citing
DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (a federal statute dealing with a familial
relationship is primarily a matter of state concern); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver
County, 328 U.S. 204, 209 (1946) (allowing states to apply local tax laws to certain
government corporations); and Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161-162 (1942) (trust
interest is defined by state law before being subjected to federal taxation).
38. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1605 (citing Jerome, 318 U.S. at 104 (desirability of
uniformity for federal criminal laws); Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119-120 (Congress believed a
uniform federal program was essential to curb the illegal use of firearms); and United States
v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 403-403 (1941) (construing revenue laws in light of the general
purpose of establishing a nationwide scheme of taxation)). "[O]nly if federal law controls
can the federal Act be given that uniform application throughout the country essential to
effectuate its purposes." Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361
(1951).
39. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1606 (citingJerome, 318 U.S. at 104 (the federal program of
criminal justice would be impaired if state law controlled); Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119 (the
purpose of the statute would be frustrated by giving effect to state law); and Pelzer, 312 U.S.
at 402-403 (state law cannot control the extent of a federal right so as to defeat the purposes
of the federal act). See also Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361
(1951) (state laws do not determine the incidents of federal rights).
40. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1606 (citing Pelzer, 312 U.S. at 403). State invasion of this
area would diminish the sovereignty of Indian tribes in direct contravention of established
federal law. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1606. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 603-
604 (1916) (Congress permitted the personal and domestic relations of Indians to be
regulated according to their tribal customs and laws); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382,
386 (1976) (right of the tribe to govern independently of state law has been upheld by
federal statute); Montana v. Blackfeet, 471 U.S. 759, 766-67 (1985) (federal government has
exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes; Indian tribes and individuals are
exempt from state taxation). The Court has emphasized that federal statutes and
regulations relating to tribes and tribal activities must be "construed generously in order to
comport with ... traditional notions of [Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of
encouraging tribal independence." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136, 143-44 (1980).
41. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
42. N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944).
43. Id.
44. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1606-1607.
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law for the definition of a critically important ICWA term.45 The
Holyfield Court noted that the ICWA and its legislative history
indicated that Congress was concerned with balancing and pro-
tecting Indian rights juxtaposed to state authorities.4" The Court
noted that one of the purposes of the ICWA was to deny state court
jurisdiction over particular child custody proceedings.47 Congress
had perceived that state courts and state representatives were par-
tially responsible for removing Indian children from their tribal
homes, causing the very problem that the ICWA was seeking to
rectify.48 Thus, the Court considered it unlikely that Congress
would leave interpretation of the ICWA's key jurisdictional provi-
sion to state courts using state law definitions.49
Second, the Court noted that Congress would not have
intended the lack of uniformity that would result from the applica-
tion of different state-law definitions of domicile.50 Not only would
45. Id. at 1606. "State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian
reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that state laws shall apply."
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-171 (1973). Many provisions of the
ICWA impose restrictions on state authority. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2) (1978) (Congress
has assumed responsibility for protecting and preserving Indian tribes); 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5)
(1978) (the states have failed to recognize essential tribal relations); 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)
(1978) (providing exclusive tribal jurisdiction over child custody proceedings for children
domiciled or residing within an Indian reservation); 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1978) (right of
Indian custodian and tribe to intervene at any point in state court proceedings); 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912 (1978) (right to notice of pending proceedings by parent or custodian and the child's
tribe); 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1978) (right of any parent or Indian custodian and the child's tribe
to petition to invalidate a child custody action of the ICWA is violated); 25 U.S.C. § 1916
(1978) (return of custody allowed notwithstanding state law to the contrary).
46. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1606.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1606 n.18 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 38101, 38103 (1978) (letter from Rep.
Udall) (state courts and agencies share in the responsibility for creating the crisis
threatening the future and integrity of Indian tribes and Indian families)). See also id.
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978) ("[c]ontributing to this problem
has been the failure of state officials, agencies, and procedures to take into account the
special problems and circumstances of Indian families and the legitimate interest of the
Indian tribe in preserving and protecting the Indian family as the wellspring of its own
future")); 1977 Hearings, supra note 14, at 24-25 (the ICWA does not refer to state law for
definition or interpretation of terms in the Act: Congressional findings specifically refer to
the misapplication of state law and state judicial authority as one of the primary reasons
leading to enactment of the remedial language contained in the ICWA).
49. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1606-1607.
50. Id. at 1607. The Court contrasted Holyfield's case to In re Adoption of Baby Child,
102 N.M. 735, 737-738, 700 P.2d 198, 200-201 (1985). In that case a New Mexico state court
found exclusive tribal jurisdiction over an adoption of an illegitimate Indian child born off
the reservation. Id. The Holyfield Court noted that if state-law definitions of domicile were
to be utilized, a different result would occur if the child had been transported to Mississippi
for adoption. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1607.
One of the reasons that the Court granted plenary review of this case was because of
conflicting decisions among state courts. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1604; Id. at 1604 n.14
(citing In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 968 (Utah 1986) (moving a child off the
reservation cannot be used to frustrate the purpose of the ICWA); In re Appeal in Pima
County Juvenile Action No. § -903, 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187, 191 (Ct. App. 1981)
(although the child lived out of state with prospective adoptive parents, his domicile had
not changed from the reservation)). Cf. In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 70, 495 P.2d 179, 181
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the possibility exist that the rules of domicile, and thus jurisdiction,
might apply inconsistently to different Indian children, but the
rules could conceivable apply differently to the same child as a
result of crossing state lines.51 The Court concluded that Congress
could not have intended such a lack of uniformity, 52 and the gen-
eral rule that domicile is determined by the law of the forum is
inapplicable for the ICWA.53
To construe the term "domicile" in Holyfield, the Court
reviewed the judicial history of the case.5 4 The Supreme Court of
Mississippi had determined that the twin babies were not domi-
ciled on the Choctaw Reservation on the basis of two findings of
fact: First, the children had never been physically present on the
reservation, and second, the parents had "voluntarily surren-
dered" them.55
From these findings, the Court began its analysis in determin-
ing whether the twin children were domiciled off the reservation
under the federal law of domicile intended by Congress when it
enacted the ICWA.5 6 In order to interpret the term "domicile" in
the circumstances of the present case, the Court considered the
ordinary meaning of the word and the purpose of the statute.
The Court found it permissible to utilize established common-law
principles of domicile when consistent with the legislative intent
of the ICWA.5 1 The term "domicile" is widely used and well-
accepted.,9 The Court in Holyfield recognized that domicile is
(1972) (state placed an Indian child in a foster home three days after leaving the reservation
to accompany his father on a trip).
51. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1607. The Court noted that state law definitions of domicile
could conceivably encourage the development of adoption brokerage businesses and the
transportation of children across state lines to circumvent tribal jurisdiction. Id. at 1607
n.20.
52. Id. at 1607. When Congress intends a state-law definition to control, it has stated
so. Id. at 1607 n.22. Congress made specific provisions when it intended that ICWA terms
be defined by other than federal law, e.g., § 1903(2) defines "extended family member" by
reference to tribal law and custom. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (1978)).
53. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1607 n.21 (domicile is determined by the law of the forum is
inapplicable in this case). Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13
(1971)).
54. Id. at 1607.
55. Id. (citing Holyfield, 511 So. 2d at 921).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1607-1608 (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962) (legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words); Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 21 (1983) (utilizing the ordinary meaning of "interest" and assuming that Congress
has intentionally included or excluded language); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S.
270, 285 (1956) (consider the intent of a bill when the meaning of particular terms are in
doubt)).
58. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608. The Court noted that common-law principles can
add to understanding Congress' intentions. Id.
59. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608. According to Weintraub, one of the classic definitions
of domicile is: "[W]hat the law means by domicile is the one technically pre-eminent
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not equivalent to residence.60 It is established by intent and physi-
cal presence.6 The Court noted that a domicile of origin is
acquired at birth and continues until a new domicile, one of
choice, is selected.6 2 The domicile of a child is determined by the
parents' domicile. 3 If illegitimate, the child takes the domicile of
the mother.64 Therefore, domicile may be a location where the
child has never been. 5  The Court applied these principles in
Holyfield and noted that the mother's (and father's) domicile was
the Choctaw Reservation. 6 Thus, the Court concluded that at
birth the twins were also domiciled on the reservation.6 7
headquarters, which, as a result either of fact or fiction, every person is compelled to have
in order that by aid of it certain rights and duties which have been attached to it by the law
may be determined." 2 R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 12
(1980) (quoting Bergner and Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 154, 157, 51 N.E.
531, 532, (1898)). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11-23
(1971) (definitions of domicile); 4 R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUNGAL, AND R. FELIX, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW 17-38 (1986) (common-law definitions of domicile).
60. Holyfield, 209 S. Ct. at 1608 (citing Perri v. Kisselback, 34 N.J. 84, 87, 167 A.2d 377,
379 (1961). It is possible to be domiciled in one location while residing in another.
Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1608 (citing District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941) (living
in the District of Columbia while in government service does not change domicile)).
61. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608 (citing Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939)
(residence coupled with intent are the essential elements of domicile).
62. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608 (citing In re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 81, 182 N.W.
227, 228 (1921) (describing domicile of origin, of choice, and by operation of law)). The
concept of domicile is one of a legal relation between a person and a place created by law to
serve the law's purpose. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 59, at 19.
63. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608 (citing In re Estate of Moore, 68 Wash. 2d 792, 796,
415 P.2d 653, 656 (1966) (an unemancipated child cannot unilaterally acquire, change, or
determine domicile)). A child's domicile is determined by the parents because minors are
legally incapable of forming the requisite intent to establish a domicile so the parents'
choice is determinative. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608 (citing Yarborough v. Yarborough,
290 U.S. 202, 211 (1933) (domicile is not determined by the minor's residence)).
Several cases have interpreted the "resides or is domiciled" language of § 191 1(a) of the
ICWA. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. S-903, 130 Ariz. 202, 635
P.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1981). A 15-year-old minor gave birth out-of-state and executed a
voluntary relinquishment for adoption in Arizona. Id. at -, 635 P.2d at 189. However,
because the mother was domiciled on a reservation in Montana, the illegitimate child
acquired the mother's domicile. Id. at -, 635 P.2d at 191. See, e.g., Matter of Adoption of
Baby Child, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (1985). The Indian mother of an illegitimate child
placed her child for adoption off-reservation through the New Mexico courts. Id. at -, 700
P.2d at 199. The father and the tribe ultimately obtained state court dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that an illegitimate child takes the domicile of its
mother at the time of its birth. Id. at -, 700 P.2d at 201.
64. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608 (citing Kowalski v. Wojkowski, 19 N.J. 247, 258, 116
A.2d 6, 12 (1955), Moore, 68 Wash. 2d at 796, 415 P.2d at 656 (if legitimate, a child has the
father's domicile, if illegitimate, the mother's controls), RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, at
§ 14 (2) ("If the child is not the legitimate child of its father ... , its domicile at birth is the
domicile of its mother at that time")).
65. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, at § 14(2)
comment b ("[O]n occasion, a child's domicile of origin will be in a place where the child
has never been")).
66. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608.
67. Id. The only reference to state law and domicile under the ICWA appears in BIA
(Bureau of Indian Affairs) Guidelines interpreting the Act, published a year after the ICWA
was enacted. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian child custody proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67584-67595 (1979). Comments on the proposed guidelines recommended that definitions
of domicile and residence for § 191 l(a) be adopted to avoid any misinterpretation of these
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The Court in Holyfield also stated that the children's domicile
does not change because the children were voluntarily surren-
dered.6" The Court concluded that actions of individual tribe
members cannot defeat the purpose of tribal jurisdiction, which
was to protect the resources and stability of Indian tribes. 9 The
Court further recognized that Congress had considered evidence
regarding the negative effect on Indian children and Indian tribes
caused by placement in non-Indian homes.7 ° Congress regulated
such placements by the ICWA because of concerns that were
broader than the desires of individual parents.71 The Court indi-
cated that Congress' objectives would be defeated if Indian par-
ents could circumvent the ICWA jurisdictional provisions.7 2
terms by the state courts. Id. at 67585. The Bureau declined stating: "definitions were not
included because these terms are well defined under existing law. There is no indication
that these state law definitions tend to undermine, in any way, the purposes of the Act." Id.
Case law decided prior to the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act, as well as
cases decided in state courts since the Act have all analyzed the question of a child's
domicile consistent with the provisions of the Restatement. See, e.g., Matter of Appeal in
Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1981); Matter
of Adoption of a Baby Child, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (1985); In the matter of the
Adoption of Jeremiah Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).
68. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608.
69. Id. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (3) (1988) ("there is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children"); 25 U.S.C. § 1902
(1988) ("promote the stability and security of Indian tribes").
70. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1609.
71. Id. In addition to substantive provisions protecting the tribes' rights, Congress was
concerned with children's rights. Id. In discussing interracial adoptions, author David
Fanshel comments on the tribe's perspective: "Interracial adoption is perceived as an
assault on the struggle for survival of Indian people in the United States." D. FANSHEL,
FAR FROM THE RESERVATION 341 (1970). Indian leaders would prefer to see their children
share the fate of their fellow Indians, however impoverished that might be. Id. Testimony
at congressional hearings provided many examples of Indian children placed in non-Indian
homes and later suffering from debilitating identity crises when they reached adolescence.
1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 46. This occurred even when the children had few
memories of living as part of an Indian community. Id.
There is clinical evidence to suggest that Indian children placed in non-Indian homes
are at risk in their later development. Supportive Care, Custody, Placement, and Adoption
of American Indian Children, National Conference Sponsored by the American Academy
of Child Psychiatry 82 (1977). Often Indian children are cared for by well-intentioned
foster or adoptive parents. Id. Nonetheless, particularly in adolescence, they are subject to
ethnic confusion and a pervasive sense of abandonment. Id. These problems, combined
with their early childhood preplacement experiences, adversely affect their young
adulthood and their own potential capacities as parents. Id.
Dr. Joseph Westermeyer testified that adopted Indian adolescents were raised
frequently with a white cultural and social identity. 1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 46.
They are raised in a white home. Id. They attended predominantly white schools and
churches and came to understand very little about Indian culture, Indian behavior, and
thus had virtually no viable Indian identity. Id. Then during adolescence, they found that
society was not to grant them a white identity. Id. They began to find this out in a number
of ways. Id. For example, a universal experience was that when they began to date white
children, the parents of white youngsters were opposed. Id. Another experience was
derogatory name calling in relation to their racial identity. Id. See generally G. Powell, The
Psychosocial Development of Minority Group Children 351 (1983).
72. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1609-1610 (citing In re Adoption of Child of Indian
Heritage, 111 N.J. 155, 168-171, 543 A.2d 925, 931-933 (1988)). It was perceived that the
best way to protect the child was by protecting its relationship to the tribe. Id. at 1609 n.24
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Appellees argue that the Indian mother selected the Holyfields as
parents for her children and gave birth off the reservation to
accomplish that purpose.73 However, the Court responded that
permitting individuals to avoid exclusive tribal jurisdiction by giv-
ing birth off the reservation would completely nullify the purpose
of the ICWA.7 4
The Court refused to allow the law of domicile in the ICWA to
(citing In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, No. S-903, 130 Ariz. 202, 204, 635 P.2d
187, 189 (Ct. App. 1985)). See Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) ("[t]ribal courts
have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of
disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-
Indians").
73. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1610.
74. Id. All Choctaw mothers give birth off the reservation to take advantage of county
obstetrical facilities. Id. at 610 n.27. Application of the state law of domicile would allow
the state courts to circumvent tribal jurisdiction. Id.
Congress noted that many "voluntary" consents to termination of parental rights,
placement, and adoption are not truly voluntary. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1978). See In re Adoption of an Indian Child, III N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925 (1988).
Economic factors led Congress to provide safeguards against voluntary relinquishments to
state and private agencies. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978).
Moreover, in view of the great demand for adoptable babies in 1988 society, a state-law
definition of domicile could encourage the adoption brokerage business. Holyfield, 109 S.
Ct. at 1607 n.20. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 NJ. 396, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (1988) (shortage
of adoptable babies gives rise to surrogate parenting arrangements). The Court in Holyfield
noted that the Supreme Court of Utah in a leading ICWA case expressed concern about
allowing individuals to destroy the bond between Indian children and their tribes:
To the extent that [state] abandonment law operates to permit [the child's]
mother to change [the child's] domicile as part of a scheme to facilitate his
adoption by non-Indians while she remains a domiciliary of the reservation, it
conflicts with and undermines the operative scheme established by subsections
[1911 (a)] and [1913 (a) ] to deal with children of domiciliaries of the reservation
and weakens considerably the tribe's ability to assert its interest in its children.
The protection of this tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, which recognizes
that the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on a parity
with the interest of the parents. This relationship between Indian tribes and
Indian children domiciled on the reservation finds no parallel in other ethnic
cultures found in the United States. It is a relationship that many non-Indians
find difficult to understand and that non-Indian courts are slow to recognize....
[State] abandonment law cannot be used to frustrate the federal legislative
judgment expressed in the ICWA that the interests of the tribe in custodial
decisions made with respect to Indian children are as entitled to respect as the
interests of the parents.
Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1610 (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969-970
(Utah 1986)).
Congress was very concerned about maintaining the child's relationship with the
extended family and tribe. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (b) (1988); 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988); In re
Pima County, 130 Ariz. 202, 204, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (1981); In re J.M., 718 P.2d 150, 152
(Alaska 1986). In most Indian cultures the child's relationships with the extended family
and tribe are neither subordinate to nor less important than the biological parent/child
relationship and, in fact, under tribal law and custom, extended family members often have
specific child-rearing responsibilities and duties. Brief for Appellant at - (LEXIS)
Holyfield, (No. 87-980). To entirely defer to the jurisdictional preference of the parent
relinquishing parental rights, as suggested by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the Court
would give that parent a power that he or she would not ordinarily have in most Indian
societies - family, clan, and tribe. Id. To do so makes primary the personal needs of a
relinquishing parent at the expense of the best interests of the Indian child as determined
by Congress. Id.
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be one that would enable individual tribal members to defeat the
tribe's exclusive jurisdiction. 5 The twin babies were found by the
Holyfield Court to be domiciled on the reservation when the
Holyfield adoption was initiated, and hence, the Choctaw tribal
court possessed exclusive jurisdiction.7 6 The state court had been
without jurisdiction, and its adoption decree was vacated. 77
Although the Court noted that three years had passed since the
birth of the twins, and that a separation from their adopted family
would cause considerable pain, it did not address the issue of who
should have custody of the children. 78  The Court deferred to the
Choctaw Tribal Court for that determination. 9
The decision, however, was not unanimous.8 ° In his dissent,
Justice Stevens agreed with the Court that Congress intended the
ICWA to provide a uniform national law and that domicile must be
defined as Congress intended; however, he disagreed with the
resulting definition." Justice Stevens' primary argument was that
the narrow definition of domicile provided by the majority closed
state court procedures to Indian parents and distorted the balance
maintained by the ICWA between individual and group rights.8"
Justice Stevens noted that the ICWA was passed in response to the
destruction of Indian families caused by the "removal" of their
children by nontribunal agencies and the states' failure to recog-
nize tribal relations.8 3 Justice Stevens interpreted the focus of the
ICWA as addressing the problem of unjustified removal through
the use of standards that fail to properly recognize the Indian
75. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1610. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988).
76. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1610-1611.
77. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1611. See, 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988).
78. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1611. The law cannot be applied to "reward those who
obtain custody, whether lawfully or otherwise, and maintain it during any ensuing (and
protected) litigation." Id. at 1611 (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972
(Utah 1986)).
79. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1611. The judgement of the Mississippi Supreme Court was
reversed and the case was remanded. Id.
80. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1611. Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice
Kennedy dissented. Id.
81. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1611 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting District of Columbia
v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 449 (1941) (interpretation of a term's meaning should be based on
congressional history, the specific situation, and judicial precedent)).
82. Id. at 1612. Evidence of the parents' intent to exercise state court jurisdiction
included the mother selecting a hospital 200 miles from the reservation for the birth,
signing an advance consent-to-adoption form reaffirming her desire to have the children
adopted by the Holyfields in state court, and wanting Mrs. Holyfield to retain custody after
the Tribe challenged the adoption. Id. at 1611. Mr. Orrey Holyfield died during the appeal
to the Supreme Court. Id. at 1603 n.9. Yet, because the majority concluded that her
domicile was on the reservation, she was denied access to the state courts. Id. at 1603.
83. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1612 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) and
1901 (5) (1988).
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culture. 4
According to Justice Stevens, the provisions of the ICWA that
define minimum standards for placing children in non-Indian
homes and for protecting the Indian parents' procedural rights are
most important. 85 Justice Stevens noted that although the tribes
are given specific powers under the ICWA, they do not have the
power to restrict parents' rights.8 6 Similarly, the jurisdictional pro-
visions were designed to preserve tribal sovereignty over the
domestic relations of its members,8 7 not to deprive states of their
traditional jurisdiction over Indian children.8 8 Justice Stevens per-
ceived that Congress intended to overrule discretionary abuses,
while sanctioning the exercise of state court jurisdiction when
appropriate.8 9
Justice Stevens argued that the use of the term "domicile" in
the ICWA was intended to allow an Indian to express an intent
regarding a permanent domicile which should not be superceded
by a concept of domicile based on physical location at any one
moment in time.90 Justice Stevens further suggested that the
84. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1612.
85. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(bXc) (1988) (examination of documents, right to
counsel); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(dXeXf) (1978) (establishing stringent standards of proof that
efforts have been made to preserve the Indian family); 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (1988) (consent
must be explained and can be withdrawn if obtained through fraud or duress); 25 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (1988) (establishing criteria for placements that favor the Indian child's extended
family or tribe)).
86. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1613 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)
(1988) (for transfer of proceedings to a tribal court for Indian children not domiciled on the
reservation); 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(c) (1988) (right of intervention by Indian custodian or tribe in
state court proceedings); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988) (tribal right of notice in involuntary
termination proceedings but not in voluntary ones); 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988) (power to
petition to set aside parental termination if ICWA provisions have been violated)).
87. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1613 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1613 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited
legislative history to indicate that Congress did not intend "to oust the states of their
traditional jurisdiction over Indian children falling within their geographical limits." Id.
(citing H.R. Rep. No., 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978)). See Wamser, Child Welfare
Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A New Mexico Focus, 10 N.M.L. REV., 413,
415-416 (1980) (discusses history and procedural deficiencies such as lack of due process and
counsel).
89. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1613-1614 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Congress approved
cases in which state courts declined jurisdiction over children who were wards of tribal
court. Id. (citing In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976); Wakefield
v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975)). Congress, however, approved state court
jurisdiction over Indian children who had never lived on a reservation. Id. (citing In re
Greybull, 23 Or. App. 674, 543 P.2d 1079 (1975)). See United States ex. rel. Cobell v. Cobell,
503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974) (voluntary invocation of state court jurisdiction in a divorce
action also submitted the question of children's custody).
90. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1614 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Domicile was intended to
serve a limited purpose. Id. (citing American Indian Policy Review Comm., Report on
Federal, State, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (Comm. Print 1976)). In
Halloway, the Utah State Supreme Court noted that the ICWA does not expressly define
how domicile is to be established. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah
1986). Questions of domicile were left to be determined under state law. Id. at 967.
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ICWA acknowledges that allowing the tribe to defeat the parents'
choice of child custody forums would not contribute to the best
interests of the child or the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families.9 '
If the Choctaw mother had established a domicile off the res-
ervation, state courts would have been required to process the
adoption.92 Justice Stevens proposed that the same result should
occur when parents express a desire to establish an off-reservation
domicile for their children.93 Justice Stevens suggested that the
law of abandonment does not defeat, but rather furthers the pur-
pose of the ICWA.94 When a child is abandoned by both parents to
a person off the reservation,95 no purpose of the ICWA is promoted
91. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1614 (Stevens J., dissenting). See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b) (1988)
(providing Indian parents the right to veto transfer from state court to tribal court in the
case of concurrent jurisdiction). Congress is allowing Indian parents to defend in the court
system issues that reflect familial beliefs and customs. Jones, supra note 16, at 1141. Where
concurrent jurisdiction exists, the state court may refuse to transfer for "good cause," and
the court is allowed to consider the parent's or child's preference where appropriate. Note,
The ICWA of 1977: Provisions and Policy, 25 S.D.L. REV. 98, 103 (1980). In a voluntary
proceeding, the tribe is not entitled to notice and the parent's preference may be good
cause to place the child with a non-Indian family. Id. at 111.
Justice Stevens quoted Chief Calvin Isaac: "The ultimate responsibility for child
welfare rests with the parents and we would not support legislation which interfered with
that basic relationship." Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1615 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. ofl Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978)).
92. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1615 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id. See Halloway, 732 P.2d at 966; C.S. v. Smith, 483 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972).
94. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1615 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A child is abandoned when a
parent surrenders physical custody as well as all parental rights and obligations. Id. The
intent must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Abandonment occurs "when
the parent gives the custody of the child to another with the intention of relinquishing his
parental rights and obligations." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 22 comment e (1971)). Following complete abandonment by both parents, domicile is
determined by the in loco parentis of the child. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962,
966 (Utah 1986); In re Estate of Moore, 68 Wash. 2d 792, 796, 415 P.2d 653, 656 (1966);
Harlan v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 194 Cal. 352, 359, 228 P. 654, 657 (1924); In re
Guardianship of D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 282 (S.D. 1980); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22 comment i (1971). Stevens noted that the authority of a
state to exercise jurisdiction over a child when the child is physically present in a state and
has been abandoned is also recognized by federal statute. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1615 n. 10
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(CX2) (1980). See also Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. § 3 (1988);
N.D. CENT. CODE, §§ 14-14-01, 14-14-26 (1981).
95. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1616 (Stevens, J., dissenting). None of the cases approving
tribal court jurisdiction cited by Congress involved a deliberate abandonment. Wakefield v.
Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975) (the court upheld exclusive tribal jurisdiction
where it was clear that no abandonment occurred); Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville
Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 722 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (the children were
orphaned but there was no abandonment); In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555
P.2d 1334 (1976) (the child was a ward of the tribal court and an enrolled member of the
tribe and again there was no abandonment although the natural parents did everything
they could to abandon the children off the reservation).
Although an adoption consent form may not be legally adequate for the adoption, it
may effect an abandonment and thus, a change of domicile for the child. Holyfield, 109 S.
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by denying state court jurisdiction because no interest in tribal
self-governance is threatened.9 6
Justice Stevens noted that the Court's decision may force a
child living off the reservation to be transported to a tribal court
unfamiliar with the child's present living conditions.9 7 It renders a
custody decision made by a state court susceptible to challenge at
any time.98 It forces parents who want to use the state court sys-
tem to establish a domicile off the reservation.99 Justice Stevens
concluded that the majority's interpretation of domicile does not
serve the ICWA's goal of fostering permanence and continuity for
Indian groups.10 0
This case illustrates three areas of significance relating specifi-
cally to the ICWA and to family law in general: implementation
and interpretation of the ICWA, the best interests of the child, and
the conflict between Indian and non-Indian cultural and social sys-
tems. These areas each represent unresolved issues, and when
they interact, the problems for the legal system are complex.
ICWA cases usually involve jurisdictional legal questions
between the tribes, the state, and the federal government.' 1
There is a need to resolve these jurisdictional issues so that states
are clear about their legal rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis
Indian tribes.10
2
Ct. at 1616 n.ll (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Wilson v. Pierce, 14 Utah 2d 317, 321, 383
P.2d 925, 927 (1963); H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 633
(1968).
96. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1616 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If both parents have invoked
the jurisdiction of the state court, no interest in tribal self-governance is implicated. See
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 219-220 (1959); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892).
97. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1616 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The ICWA failed to consider
that many children subject to its provisions are of multi-racial backgrounds with little
Indian heritage. Note, In Re Junious M: The California Application of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 8 J. Juv. L. 74, 84 (1984). Many American Indians are urbanized and have few
ties to a tribe other than membership. Id. The Act, however, requires that the future of
these urban, racially mixed children may be determined by a tribal court that knows
nothing about that environment. Id. See In Re Junious M. v. Diana L., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 41,
14 Cal. App. 3d 786, 789 (1983) (child lived for six years with a foster mother who wished to
adopt him, but the tribe blocked adoption because his natural mother was not given
visitation rights - an impossible situation because the child became ill at visitation times).
98. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1616 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See In Re Adoption of
Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986) (the Indian tribe set aside a two year adoption
placement because the natural mother had resided on the reservation and the tribal court
should have had jurisdiction).
99. Holyfield, 109 St. Ct. at 1616 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It makes wealth and the
ability to establish an off-reservation domicile the criterion for access to state courts. Id.
100. Id. at 1616-1617. Stevens noted that the disruption and pain caused to the
adoptive parents, the children, and their natural parents resulted from failure to follow the
provisions of the ICWA. Id. at 1617. However, denying voluntary access to state courts will
result in similar problems in the future. Id.
101. Canby, Forward, 31 ARiz. L. REV. 191, 192 (1989).
102. Id.
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To activate the ICWA provisions, a two-pronged test must be
cleared: First, the child must be defined as an Indian under ICWA
guidelines.10 3  Second, a child custody determination must be
involved.1 0 4 If both are answered yes, the state court must comply
with the Act, and the first issue is jurisdiction.10 5 The key in apply-
ing section 1911 lies in determining what constitutes domicile, res-
idence, abandonment, or emancipation of the child. 10 6 Holyfield
determined that federal statutory law, rather than state common-
law definitions of domicile would control. 0 7 Whether this area of
federal preemption also operates to supersede state abandonment
or emancipation law remains unclear.10 8 Several cases have sug-
gested that this is so, and the tribal court will retain exclusive
jurisdiction.109
If the child is not domiciled on the reservation, concurrent
103. AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CENTER, INC., INDIAN FAMILY LAW AND CHILD
WELFARE 74-75 (1982) [hereinafter INDIAN FAMILY LAW]. Jurisdiction under the ICWA is
extended only to Indian children involved in specific custody cases. Note, The ICWA of
1978, 25 S.D.L. REV. 98, 101 (1980). An "Indian child" is under legal age, unmarried, a
current member of a tribe, or eligible for membership as the natural child of a member. Id.
at 101-102. Legal practitioners must check the eligibility requirements for each tribe
involved in a child custody proceeding because membership requirements vary. Id. at 102.
The ICWA defines "Indian child's tribe" as "(a) the Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a
member or eligible for membership or (b) in the case of an Indian child who is a member of
or eligible for membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian
child has more significant contacts." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(5) (1988). Factors the state court
should consider in determining the child's tribe include the child's length of residence,
participation in tribal activities, fluency in a tribal language, previous adjudication by a
tribal court, residence of the child's relatives, tribal membership of a parent, and tribal
response to the notice. 44 Fed. Reg. 24000, 24002 (1979).
104. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988). Four types of cases are specified as "child custody
proceeding[s]:" foster care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive
placement, and adoptive placement. Id. The ICWA does not provide for jurisdiction over
custody proceedings predicated on divorce, separation, or delinquent acts. Indian Family
Law, supra note 103, at 75.
105. Indian Family Law, supra note 103, at 74.
106. Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1978).
107. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1607. The Court in Holyfield noted that there is case law
supporting the contention that abandonment may create a change of domicile, but this is a
minority view. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1609 n.26. See Halloway, 732 P.2d at 967 (Utah
abandonment law was not applied to defeat the purpose of the ICWA). In response to the
suggestion that an abandonment had occurred in Holyfield, the Court determined that it
was not effective in any case because the parents consented to termination of their parental
rights before a judge of the state court and not a tribal judge. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1609
n.26. The majority discounted the fact that the natural parents did everything possible to
abandon the children off the reservation. Id. at 1615-1616 n.11.
108. See In Re Guardianship of D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 282 (S.D. 1980)
(the court found no evidence of abandonment of parental responsibility and control in
foster case so state abandonment law was inapplicable); In re Adoption of Halloway, 732
P.2d 962, 967 (Utah 1986Xunder federal preemption analysis, Utah abandonment law could
not be applied). But see Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987Xtrial court finding of
abandonment by Indian father reversed but state court jurisdiction upheld nevertheless).
109. See 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(b) (1988). See, e.g., Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 967 (Utah 1986);
In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (Ct.
App. 1981).
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jurisdiction exists.11 ° Issues for state courts may arise when deter-
mining whether there is good cause not to transfer the proceeding
to a tribal court.1"1  Although case by case discrimination permits
some flexibility, there is a corresponding danger of overusing or
inappropriately using the good cause exception, and thus sub-
verting the purpose of the ICWA.
112
Children are singled out by law for special attention. They
are presumed to be incomplete beings who are not competent to
determine their own interests." 3 When families can not respond
adequately to the needs of their children, society attempts to
ensure a suitable environment utilizing child placement laws.
1 4
It is somewhat paradoxical that the ICWA, which was enacted
to further the best interests of Indian children, forbids considering
the best interest of the individual Indian child." 5 The ICWA
presumes that the child's best interest results from protecting the
relationship between the child and the tribe. 1 16  A traditional
"best interest of the child" standard was rejected by Congress
because it was susceptible to bias by state agencies and courts."
7
110. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
111. Id. According to legislative history of the Act, "good cause" to the contrary is to
be applied by state courts as a modified doctrine offorum non-conveniens. Holyfield, 109
S. Ct. at 1614 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The guidelines suggested by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, however, expand the application of this modified doctrine. 44 Fed. Reg. 24000,
24001 (1979). "Good cause to the contrary" is defined as including but not limited to the
facts that (1) the child's biological parents are unavailable; (2) no Indian custodian has been
appointed; (3) the child has had little contact with the tribe for a significant period of time;
(4) the child has not resided on the reservation for a significant period of time; and (5) the
child, over 12 years of age, has indicated opposition to the transfer. Id.
112. Note, supra note 16, at 113. The ICWA has been criticized as ineffective because
it is not drafted to afford the best protection for Indian children and their families within
the tribal system. Id. The Act may actually be detrimental to Indian children if its
consequence is to create confusion in state courts. Id.
Notification of the tribe is the responsibility of state and private agencies. Barsch, supra
note 16, at 1334. These public agencies initially decide whether a tribe is eligible to
intervene and if a transfer should be granted. Id. The tribe is not required to intervene in
the family situation when the problem arises. Id. Instead, the tribe is allocated to an
adversarial position after legal proceedings have been initiated. Id. Thus, prevention or
early intervention are not emphasized. Id. The only answer often is then removal of the
child. J. SWENSON, SUPPORTIVE CARE, CUSTODY, PLACEMENT AND ADOPTION OF
AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN 83 (1977) (statement of American Academy of Child
Psychiatry). The Act provides for no review of placement or monitoring to ensure that the
best interests of the child are being met. Note, supra note 16, at 114.
113. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 3 (1973).
114. Id. at 5. The question is the degree to which the law can create a "parent" for a
child in order to protect and foster physical and emotional growth. Id.
115. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978). The underlying principle of the ICWA is the best
interest of the Indian child. Note, supra note 16, at 114.
116. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608.
117. Note, In Rejunious M.: The California Application of the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 8 J. Juv. L. 74, 84 (1980). Different standards regarding appropriate child placements
include misinterpretation of child rearing practices and failing to recognize the importance
of extended family. Id. at 76.
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However, the rejection of the best interest standard may work to
the disadvantage of the child because interest in tribal integrity
and self-government is given precedence over the child's
interests." 18
In fact, the court must apply the Act even when it is detri-
mental to the best interests of the child. 1 9 In Holyfield, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi noted that a desire to consider the
welfare of the child cannot nullify jurisdictional requirements.1 2 0
A court must have a legal basis for effectuating an equitable resolu-
tion of a dispute. 12' The United States Supreme Court recognized:
Whatever feelings we might have as to where the twins
should live, however, it is not for us to decide that ques-
tion. We have been asked to decide the legal question of
who should make the custody determination concerning
these children - not what the outcome of that determi-
nation should be.122
However, the interests of society may best be served by protecting
and fostering the needs of its children.' 23
The Holyfield case also illustrates the impact of the social and
cultural environment on legislative and judicial determinations.
The fact that inappropriate decisions were made on the basis of
misperceptions about Indian culture was made apparent during
the congressional hearings. 1 4 The extraordinary high placement
118. See, e.g., In Re Junious M. v. Diana L., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40,41, 144 Cal. App. 3d 786,
789- (1983Xthe child's best interest was subordinated to the requirements of the Act
illustrating the problem urban, racially mixed children have in their best interest decided
by a tribal court with little knowledge of that lifestyle); In re D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d
278, 282 (1980) (alleged neglect and abuse is a matter for the tribal court because
reservation domicile is not lost by a supposed abandonment); In re Appeal in Pima County
Juvenile Action No. S-903, 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187, 190-191 (Ct. App. 1981X"the best
interest of the child was that he remain with his prospective adoptive parents" but the
adoptive order was vacated). But see In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J.
155, _, 543 A.2d 925, 937 (1988Xadoption placement of three years duration upheld by
determining Indian father did not qualify as parent within meaning of ICWA).
119. Note, In Re D.L.L. and CL.L., Minors: Ruling on the Constitutionality of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 26 S.D.L. REV. 67, 75 (1981).
120. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 511 So. 2d 918, 919 (Miss. 1987).
121. Id. at 919-920.
122. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1611.
123. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 113, at 7. One problem which
Justice Stevens noted is that any adoption of an Indian child effected through a state court
will be vulnerable to dispute by the tribe indefinitely regardless of the seeming
permanence of the child's new home. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1616 n.12 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Tension exists between the apparent meaning of the best interest standard and
its construction in legislative and court decisions. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 113, at 54.
Delays are an expected aspect of court determinations and review. Id. at 55. Courts have
not considered the effect of these delays on children's psychological development. Id. This
reflects prioritizing the competing interests of the child and the adult, with the child's
interests often subordinate. Id. at 54.
124. 1977 Hearings, supra note 14; 1978 Hearings, supra note 14. The problem of
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rate of Indian children may reflect an insensitivity to important
psychological and cultural variables by welfare officials coupled
with a willingness of state officials to meet growing adoption
demands.',' Child placement determinations made by state
courts tend to conform to the majority culture's standards for
acceptability and do not reflect the child's sociocultural
background. 126
The jurisdictional dilemma which exists between state and tri-
bal courts has resulted because of different considerations regard-
ing the interests of the child.'1 7 It reflects an effort to define the
role of tribal power and self-government as distinct from states'
rights with, unfortunately, the child often caught in between.' 2
APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA
In terms of numbers, the problem that the ICWA is attempt-
ing to redress exists in North Dakota.' 29 In 1978 when the ICWA
was enacted, there were 8,126 Indian children under twenty-one
in North Dakota.' 3 ° Of these, 269 (or 1 out of every 30.4) Indian
children were adopted.' 3 1 Seventy-five percent were adopted by
non-Indian families.' 32 The adoption rate for non-Indian children
Indian child welfare is of crisis proportions and will abate only when new guidelines for
identifying mistreatment are promulgated. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1978). Many social workers make value judgments about the familial environment that are
inaccurate and inappropriate due to a lack of knowledge about Indian culture and Indian
societal norms. Id.
The "ill-conceived" actions of child welfare workers could be neutralized if courts were
able to compare precise instances of alleged mistreatment or neglect with Indian standards.
Id. at 11. Guidelines for foster and adoptive care are based on middle-class values and
virtually preclude Indian families from qualifying as caregivers. Id.
125. 1977 Hearings, supra note 14, at 101 (statement by American Civil Liberties
Union). The high proportion of Indian children being placed in non-Indian homes is not an
indication that Indian children are abused or neglected at a greater rate than non-Indian
children. Id. Actually fewer Indian children are abused when comparing similar size
populations than blacks or whites. Yates, infra note 128, at 1136. More often Indians find it
difficult to care for their children due to extreme poverty. Id. Impoverished conditions
may be misinterpreted by welfare agencies and officials who are unfamiliar with prevailing
standards. 1977 Hearings, supra note 14, at 187. The removal of children from Indian
homes results from a failure to help a disadvantaged population develop adequate means
for raising their children. Id. The end result has been "a form of genocide." Id.
126. J. SWENSON, SUPPORTIVE CARE, CUSTODY, PLACEMENT AND ADOPTION OF
AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN 83 (1977). See Rodham, Children Under The Law, 43 HARV.
ED. REV. 487, 514 (1973Xadvocating community involvement to provide a check on judicial
discretion).
127. Jones, supra note 16, at 1124-1125.
128. Id. See Yates, Current Status and Future Directions of Research on the American
Indian Child, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1135 (1987Xdiscusses the higher rate of emotional
and behavioral problems in Indian compared to non-Indian children as a result of
acculturation stress).
129. 1977 Hearings, supra note 14, at 539-540.
130. Final Report, supra note 12, at 48.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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was 1 out of every 86.2.133 There were therefore 2.8 times as
many Indian children in adoptive homes as non-Indian
children. 134
Indian children in foster care numbered 296 (or 1 out of every
27.7). 13' The foster care rate for non-Indians was 1 out of every
553.8.136 This amounts to 20.1 times as many Indian children in
foster care as there were non-Indian children.' 37  Per capita,
Indian children were being removed from their homes and placed
in adoptive or foster care 5.2 times more often than non-Indian
children.'13
A North Dakota tribal survey indicated that cultural mis-
perceptions were a major cause of this excessively high rate of
removal of Indian children from their Indian homes.1 39 The tribe
contended that state personnel were not equipped to judge
whether the children should be removed because they applied
standards which were not applicable to the Indian culture.' 40
Child welfare abuse was alleged in emotionally-charged testimony
by Devils Lake representatives at congressional hearings on the
Indian Child Welfare Program.' 41
The ICWA is not being followed in many state Indian child
custody proceedings although it has widespread application in
North Dakota and other western states. 142  Ignoring the Act is
likely to render a final state court decision subject to attack and
lead to possible civil liability for attorneys and social workers.' 43
The ICWA was addressed by the North Dakota Supreme
Court in B.R. T v. Executive Director of the Social Service Board of
133. Id.
134. Final Report, supra note 12, at 48.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Testimony indicated that in the Dakotas alone, the placement of Indian
children in foster home care is 17 times the state rate for all children in comparable groups.
1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 492. Indian children are placed in foster homes at 10
times the national rate in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska. Id. Although one
out of every 200 children is not in the natural home across the United States, one out of
every nine Indian children in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska are not in Indian
homes. Id. Indian children are removed from their homes at 20 times the national
average. Id. The current number of Indian children being adopted or placed in foster care
is available from the Dept. of Human Services, Child and Family Services, Bismarck, ND.
However, this data does not include any child placements determined by tribal courts.
139. 1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 139-145.
140. Id. at 95-96.
141. Id. at 95.
142. Trentadue and Demontigny, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A
Practitioner's Perspective, 62 N.D.L. REV. 487, 536-537 (1986).
143. Id. at 537.
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North Dakota.'44 The case involved an appeal from a juvenile
court order denying the motion of an Indian child's natural
mother for redetermination of the termination of her parental
rights.' 45  The court interpreted several provisions of the ICWA
and held that: 1) although the mother contends that she and her
child were in fact residents and domiciliaries of the Standing Rock
Sioux Reservation, the juvenile court had jurisdiction because the
mother claimed residency and domicile in Bismarck when the pro-
ceedings were initiated,146 2) consent to termination could not be
withdrawn after termination was final even though the adoption
decree was not entered,147 3) rehabilitative services to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family were not required in a voluntary ter-
mination, 14  4) no counsel was required for a voluntary termina-
tion,'4 9 and 5) the order could not be vacated on the grounds that
ICWA placement preferences were not followed.' 5  After
Holyfield, the key issue appears to be jurisdiction, but this ques-
tion was not disturbed on appeal.' 51
Differentiating applicable procedures on the basis of volun-
tary/involuntary termination of parental rights might be counter-
productive. 5 2  This distinction may exacerbate procedural
problems relating to use of the legal system including the lack of
144. 391 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1986).
145. B.R.T. v. Executive Director of the Social Serv. Bd. of North Dakota, 391 N.W.2d
594, 595 (N.D. 1986).
146. Id. at 599. B.R.T. contended that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction because
she and her son were residents and domiciliaries of the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation.
Id. at 598. The juvenile court found that B.R.T. and her son were domiciled in Bismarck,
and the North Dakota Supreme Court did not find this to be clearly erroneous. Id. at 599.
147. Id. at 599. B.R.T. contended that she had the right to have her son returned to
her because no final decree of adoption had been entered. Id. at 599. The North Dakota
Court, however, concluded that the termination of parental rights and the adoption were
separate proceedings. Id. (citing In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 13-14 (Alaska 1984)).
148. B.R.T, 391 N.W.2d at 600. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that
§ 1912(d) pertaining to remedial services is unclear as to whether it pertains to voluntary as
well as involuntary proceedings. Id. at 600. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988). However, the
North Dakota court concluded that it was inapplicable to voluntary proceedings so that
parents who want to initiate proceedings do not have to present evidence of their own
unsuccessful child-rearing efforts. Id.
149. B.R.T, 391 N.W.2d at 600. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the
legislative history clearly indicated that appointment of counsel was to apply only to
involuntary proceedings. Id.
150. Id. at 600-601. The district court will be required to apply the preference order
in the child's future adoption proceedings. Id. at 601. The court noted that if the
preadoptive placement procedure was defective, it would not necessarily render a
subsequent adoption procedure invalid. Id. at 601 n.10.
151. Id. at 598-599 n.5.
152. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1609 n.25. Congress intended the ICWA to apply to
voluntary as well as involuntary procedures. Id. The Court also noted Congress' concern
that some Indian parents have become so alienated from Indian society that they choose to
entrust their children to people beyond their extended family and tribe. Id. (citing H.R.
REP. No. 1356, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978)).
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counsel for Indian children and difficulties in acquiring informa-
tion available from the child's extended family and neighboring
community. 153 For example, because the Indian mother in B.R. T
had requested anonymity, the Social Service Board recommended
that any agency involved not notify the child's extended family or
tribe to give them adoption preference.' 54 This is contrary to
Holyfield, which states that individuals should not be able to
thwart the purpose of the ICWA.' 55
Implementation of the ICWA in North Dakota can best be
achieved by a familiarity with the law's content and its purpose -
protecting the Indian child, the family, and the tribe through rec-
ognition or tribal self-government and use of due process
safeguards.
Lynn A. Kerbeshian
153. 1977 Hearings, supra note 14, at 539-540.
154. B.R.T, 391 N.W.2d at 596.
155. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608.
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